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Criteria of Science, Cosmology, and Lessons of History 
Helge Kragh† 
 
Abstract  Perhaps more than any other science, cosmology exemplifies the 
inevitable contact between science and philosophy, including the problem of the 
demarcation criteria that distinguish science from non-science. Although modern 
physical cosmology is undoubtedly scientific, it is not obvious why it has this status, 
and nor is it obvious that all branches of theoretical cosmology satisfy ordinarily 
assumed criteria for science. While testability is generally admitted as an 
indispensable criterion for a theory being scientific, there is no agreement among 
cosmologists what testability means, more precisely. For example, should testability 
be taken to imply falsifiability in the sense of Popper? I discuss this and related 
questions by referring to two episodes of controversy in the history of modern 
cosmology, the debate over the steady state theory in the 1950s and the recent 
debate concerned with the anthropic multiverse. In addition, I draw attention to the 
use of historical analogies in cosmological and other scientific arguments, 
suggesting that such use is often misuse or otherwise based on distortions of the 
history of science.  
 
1.  Introduction 
Ever since the age of Galileo, at the beginning of the Scientific Revolution, 
science has expanded in both breadth and depth, conquering one area after 
the other. The development of the scientific enterprise has not occurred at a 
uniform growth rate, of course, but it has nonetheless been remarkably 
successful, progressing cognitively as well as socially and institutionally. 
Today, some 400 years after Galileo first demonstrated the inadequacy of the 
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Aristotelian cosmos and the advantages of the Copernican alternative, we 
may wonder if there are any limits at all to scientific inquiry. Will science at 
some future stage enable us to understand everything? Is scientific 
explanation limitless? These are big questions and not really the topic of this 
essay, but I shall nevertheless introduce it by some general reflections on the 
limits of science, divided in four points. 
 (i)  When it comes to the question of the limits of science, it is useful 
to distinguish between knowledge and explanation. After all, we may have 
scientific knowledge about things, even understand them on a 
phenomenological or instrumentalist level, and yet be unable to provide 
them with an explanation. Indeed, the history of science is one long series of 
temporary disharmonies between phenomenal and explanatory knowledge. 
Early radioactivity is one example of an unexplained phenomenon that 
nonetheless was investigated in great detail and with great success. Another 
example is superconductivity, which was discovered in 1911 but only 
explained on a microphysical basis with the BCS (Bardeen-Cooper-Schrieffer) 
theory dating from 1957. 
 (ii)  The question of scientific explanation obviously depends on our 
chosen criteria for what constitutes an acceptable explanation.1 These criteria 
are not provided by nature, but by the scientific community. With an 
appropriate change of the criteria scientists may be able to explain 
phenomena that previously seemed inexplicable. This point is particularly 
well illustrated by the anthropic principle, which provides explanations for a 
                                                          
1  The philosophical literature on scientific and other explanations is extensive. 
Relevant works include R. Nozick, Philosophical Explanations, Harvard University 
Press, Cambridge MA 1981, P. Achinstein, The Nature of  Explanation, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford 1983, and J. Cornwell, ed., Explanation: Styles of Explanation 
in Science, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2004. 
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variety of phenomena – from the neutron-proton mass difference to the age 
of the universe – that cannot be explained on the basis of standard physics 
and cosmology. But are anthropic explanations proper explanations at all? 
As well known, this is a matter of considerable debate and a main reason 
why the anthropic principle is controversial.2 
 (iii)  Implicitly or explicitly, the question of the limits of science refers 
to the problem of the domain of science, that is, the territory of reality to 
which science applies. Are there phenomena or concepts that lie outside the 
realm of science, or can science legitimately be applied to all aspects of 
reality? According to hard-core reductionists the latter is the case. Thus, 
Frank Tipler is by his own admission an “uncompromising reductionist,” 
implying that “everything, including human beings, can be completely 
described by physics.”3 Generally, within the tradition of positivism the 
tendency has been to define reality as just those phenomena or concepts that 
are accessible to scientific analysis.  
 However, it is possible that the world that can be observed in 
principle (and hence be subject to scientific analysis) is only part of a larger 
non-physical world to which we have no empirical access and which 
therefore transcends the domain of science as ordinarily understood. For 
example, this is what has been argued within a non-theistic context by Milton 
Munitz, a distinguished philosopher of cosmological thought. According to 
him, there is a dimension of existence, which he calls “Boundless Existence,” 
that transcends the existence of the physical universe. This Boundless 
Existence is not in space and time, it has no structure, and it can only be 
                                                          
2  See, for example, R. J. Deltete, What Does the Anthropic Principle Explain?, 
“Perspectives on Science” 1993, no. 1, pp. 285-305. 
3  F. J. Tipler, The Physics of Immortality: Modern Cosmology, God, and the Renaissance of 
the Dead, Doubleday, New York 1994, p. 352. 
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characterized – if characterized at all – in negative terms. “Boundless 
Existence,” Munitz says, “is so totally unique … that all similarities with 
anything in our ordinary experience must fall short and be inadequate.”4 
 (iv)  There are questions of a conceptual nature about which we do 
not even know whether they are meaningful or not – or, if they are 
meaningful, whether they belong to the domain of science. To indicate the 
type of these questions, a brief reference to two problems may suffice. First, 
there is the much discussed question of realized or actual infinities, of 
whether or not there can be an infinite number of objects in the universe. The 
problem has become an issue in the standard inflationary model of the flat 
universe, but it was also discussed in relation to the earlier steady state 
model according to which space was infinite and uniformly populated with 
matter. While many modern cosmologists are perfectly happy with actual 
infinities, others deny their scientific legitimacy and consider the question to 
be metaphysical.5 The point is that we do not really know whether or not it 
makes scientific sense. It makes mathematical and philosophical sense, but 
will it ever be answered scientifically?  
 If infinity is one of those frightening concepts on the border between 
physics and metaphysics, so is the concept of nothingness or absolute void. 
This is another speculation with a rich and fascinating history that recently 
has become relevant to science, not least after the discovery of the dark 
                                                          
4  M. K. Munitz, Cosmic Understanding: Philosophy and Science of the Universe, 
Princeton University Press, Princeton 1986, p. 235. See also M. K. Munitz, The 
Question of Reality, Princeton University Press, Princeton 1990. 
5  G. F. R. Ellis, U. Kirchner, W. R. Stoeger, Multiverses and Physical Cosmology, 
“Monthly Notices of the Royal Astronomical Society”2004, no. 347, pp. 921-936. On 
the disturbing infinities appearing in steady state cosmology, see R. Schlegel, The 
Problem of Infinite Matter in Steady-State Cosmology, “Philosophy of Science” 1965, no. 
32, pp. 21-31. 
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energy revealed by the acceleration of the cosmic expansion. Dark energy is 
generally identified with the vacuum energy density as given by the 
cosmological constant. However, whether or not this turns out to be true, the 
modern quantum vacuum is entirely different from absolute nothingness.  
As far as I can see, there cannot possibly be a scientific answer to what 
nothingness is, and yet it does not therefore follow that the concept is 
meaningless.6 Such a conclusion presupposes a rather narrow positivistic 
perspective. 
 In this essay I look at a fundamental question in the philosophy of 
science, namely, the defining criteria of what constitutes scientific activity 
from a cognitive point of view. Another and largely equivalent version of 
this question is the demarcation problem, that is, how to distinguish between 
science and non- or pseudoscience. Why is astronomy recognized as a 
science, when astrology and gastronomy are not? However, I shall not deal 
with these questions in a general and abstract way, but instead illustrate 
some of them by means of a couple of examples from the more recent history 
of cosmology. I focus on two cases, the one being the controversy related to 
the steady state theory in the 1950s and the other the still ongoing 
controversy over the anthropic multiverse. Although separated in time by 
half a century, in some respects they are surprisingly similar and suited for 
comparison.  
 One remarkable feature shared by the two cases is the role played by 
philosophical considerations among the scientists themselves – philosophy in 
                                                          
6  A useful overview is presented in R. Sorensen, Nothingness, “Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy” 2003, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nothingness. 
See also B. Rundle, Why there is Something Rather than Nothing, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford 2004. For the history of the concepts of vacuum and nothingness, see 
H. Genz, Nothingness: The Science of Empty Space, Basic Books, New York 1999. 
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rather than of science.7 The history of cosmology, and the history of science 
more generally, demonstrates that on the fundamental level philosophy is 
not extraneous to science but part and parcel of it. I suggest that Freeman 
Dyson was quite wrong when he stated, in a rare mood of positivism, that, 
“philosophy is nothing but empty words if it is not capable of being tested by 
experiments.”8 As will become clear, the views of science associated with 
Karl Popper’s critical philosophy played an important role in both 
controversies. For this reason, I deal particularly with these views and 
Popper’s emphasis on testability and falsifiability as defining criteria for 
science also in the area of physical cosmology. In the last section I offer some 
reflections on the use and misuse of historical analogies in the evaluation of 
scientific theories, a problem that turned up in both of the cosmological 
controversies. 
 
2.  Testability in the physical sciences 
Few modern philosophers of science believe that science can be defined 
methodologically in any simple way and, at the same time, reflect the actual 
historical course of science.9 There is no generally accepted, more or less 
invariant formulation that encapsulates the essence of science and its rich 
variation. All the same, there are undoubtedly some criteria of science and 
                                                          
7  On the concept of “philosophy in science” and some of the problems related to it, 
see M. Heller, How Is Philosophy in Science Possible?, [in:] Philosophy in Science, eds. B. 
Brozek, J. Maczka, W. P. Grygiel, Copernicus Center Press, Krakow 2011, pp. 13-24. 
8  F. Dyson, Infinite in All Directions, Perennial, New York 2004, p. 96. A balanced 
argument for the value of philosophy in cosmological research is given in E. 
McMullin, Is Philosophy Relevant to Cosmology?, “American Philosophical Quarterly” 
1981, no. 18, pp. 177-189. 
9  This section relies on material discussed more fully in a paper on Testability and 
Epistemic Shifts in Modern Cosmology submitted to “Studies in History and 
Philosophy of Modern Physics”. 
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theory choice that almost all scientists agree upon and have accepted for at 
least two centuries. Thomas Kuhn suggested five such standard criteria of 
evaluation, which he took to be (1) accuracy; (2) consistency, internal as well 
as external; (3) broadness in scope; (4) simplicity; (5) fruitfulness.10 Although 
Kuhn did not mention testability as a separate criterion, it was part of the 
first one, according to which there must be “consequences deducible from a 
theory [that] should be in demonstrated agreement with the results of 
existing experiments and observations.” Kuhn did not specifically refer to 
predictions, except that he included them under the notion of “fruitfulness.”  
 Most philosophers of science, including Kuhn himself, are aware, 
that the mentioned criteria may contradict each other in concrete situations 
and that a relative weighing may therefore be needed. But then the system 
cannot fully or uniquely determine an evaluation in a concrete case. In the 
context of modern cosmology Kuhn’s criteria have been discussed by George 
Ellis, who points out that although they are all desirable they are not of equal 
relevance and may even lead to conflicts, that is, to opposing conclusions 
with regard to theory choice.11 Still, Ellis (and most other cosmologists) finds 
the first of Kuhn’s criteria to be the one that in particular characterizes a 
scientific theory and demarcates it from other theories. In short, empirical 
testability is more than just one criterion out of many. Nearly all scientists 
consider this epistemic value an indispensable criterion for a theory being 
scientific: a theory which is cut off from confrontation with empirical data 
just does not belong to the realm of science. 
                                                          
10  T. S. Kuhn, The Essential Tension: Selected Studies in Scientific Tradition and Change, 
University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1977, pp. 321-322. 
11  G. F. R. Ellis (2007), Issues in the Philosophy of Cosmology, [in:] Philosophy of Physics, 
eds. J. Butterfield, J. Earman, North-Holland, Amsterdam 2007, pp. 1183-1286.  
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 As an example, consider Einstein, who in the period from about 1905 
to 1925 moved from a cautious empiricist position à la Mach to an almost 
full-blown rationalism. In his Herbert Spencer lecture of 1933 he famously 
stated that “we can discover by means of pure mathematical considerations 
the concepts and the laws …, which furnish they key to the understanding of 
natural phenomena. … In a certain sense, therefore, I hold it true that pure 
thought can grasp reality, as the ancients dreamed.”12 But in between these 
two expressions of his rationalist credo, there was the no less important 
sentence: “Experience remains, of course, the sole criterion of the physical 
utility of a mathematical construction.” As late as 1950, commenting on his 
latest attempt at a generalized theory of gravitation, he readily admitted that 
“Experience alone can decide on truth.”13 According to Einstein, while in the 
creative or constructive phase of a scientific theory empirical considerations 
might be wholly absent, such considerations were at the very heart of the 
context of justification. 
 While testability is universally admitted as a necessary (but not, of 
course, sufficient) condition for a theory being scientific, in practice the 
concept can be interpreted in ways that are so different that the consensus 
may tend to become rhetorical only and of little practical consequence. The 
following list of interpretive questions is not complete, but it gives an idea of 
                                                          
12  A. Einstein, Ideas and Opinions, Three Rivers Press, New York 1982. On Einstein’s 
philosophy of science, see, for example, J. Shelton, The Role of Observation and 
Simplicity in Einstein’s Epistemology, “Studies in History and Philosophy of science” 
1988, no. 19, pp. 103-118, and J. D. Norton, “Nature is the Realization of the Simplest 
Conceivable Mathematical Ideas”: Einstein and the Canon of Mathematical Simplicity, 
“Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics” 2000, no. 31, pp. 135-170. 
13  A. Einstein, On the Generalized Theory of Gravitation, “Scientific American” 1950, 
no. 182:4, pp. 13-17, on p. 17. 
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what physicists sometimes disagree about when it comes to testing of 
theories: 
1.   Actual testability (with present instrument technologies or those of a 
foreseeable future) is obviously preferable. But should it be required that 
a theory is actually testable, or will testability in principle – perhaps in 
the form of a thought experiment – suffice? 
2.   Should a theory result in precise and directly testable predictions, or will 
indirect testability do? For example, if a fundamental theory T results in 
several successfully confirmed predictions P1, P2, …, Pn, can prediction 
Pn+1 be considered to have passed a test even if it is not actually tested?14 
3.   Will a real test have to be empirical, by comparing consequences of the 
theory with experiments or observations, or do mathematical consistency 
checks also count as sufficient (theoretical) tests? 
4.  Another kind of non-empirical testing is by way of thought experiments 
or arguments of the reductio ad absurdum type that played an important 
role in the controversy over the steady state theory. A cosmological 
model may lead to consequences that are either contradictory or 
unacceptably bizarre. How should such arguments enter the overall 
evaluation picture? 
                                                          
14  It is sometimes argued that there are reasons to believe in untestable predictions 
if they follow from a well-established theory with empirical success. On this account 
the existence of other universes is “tested” by the successfully tested background 
theories, in this case quantum mechanics and inflation theory. See, for example, M. 
Tegmark, The Mathematical Universe, “Foundations of Physics” 2008, no. 38, pp. 101-
150.  On a different note, string theorists have suggested that the theory of 
superstrings has passed an empirical test because it includes gravitation without 
being designed to do so. E. Witten, Magic, Mystery, and Matrix, “Notices of the 
AMS” 1998, no. 45, 1124-1129. 
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5.   At what time in the development of a theory or research programme can 
one reasonably demand testability? Even if a theory is not presently 
testable, perhaps it will be so in a future version, such as there are many 
examples of in the history of science. 
6.   How should (lack of) testability be weighed in relation to (lack of) other 
epistemic desiderata? E.g., is an easily testable theory with a poor 
explanatory record always to be preferred over a non-testable theory 
with great explanatory power? Or what if the testable theory is overly 
complicated, and the non-testable one is mathematically unique and a 
paragon of simplicity? 
7.  Should predictions of novel phenomena be counted as more important 
than pre- or postdictions of already known phenomena? This is a 
question on which philosophers are divided and where the historical 
evidence is ambiguous.  
 
3.  A historical case: The steady state theory 
The steady state theory of the universe, proposed by Fred Hoyle, Hermann 
Bondi and Thomas Gold in 1948, aroused a great deal of philosophical 
interest, in part because of the theory’s controversial claim of continual 
creation of matter and more generally because of its appeal to philosophy 
and methods of science. For example, Bondi and Gold argued that the new 
steady state theory was preferable from a methodological point of view, as it 
was simpler, more direct, and more predictive than the cosmological theories 
based on general relativity. The latter class of theories, they said, was “utterly 
unsatisfactory” since it covered a whole spectrum of theories that could only 
be confronted with the observed universe if supplied with more or less 
arbitrary assumptions and parameters: “In general relativity a very wide 
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range of models is available and the comparisons [between theory and 
observation] merely attempt to find which of these models fits the facts best. 
The number of free parameters is so much larger than the number of 
observational points that a fit certainly exists and not even all the parameters 
can be fixed.”15 Relativistic cosmology sorely lacked the deductive character 
of the steady state theory, which uniquely led to a number of predictions, 
such as the mean density of matter, the curvature of space, and the average 
age of galaxies. According to Bondi and Gold, the predictions were crucially 
based on what they called the perfect cosmological principle (PCP), namely, 
the postulate that there is neither a privileged place nor a privileged time in 
the universe. Thus, the PCP is a temporal extension of the ordinary 
cosmological principle (CP). 
 Whether in the Bondi-Gold or the Hoyle version, the steady state 
theory was critically discussed by many philosophers and philosophically 
minded astronomers and physicists.16 To the first category belonged Adolf 
Grünbaum, Mario Bunge, Milton Munitz, Norwood Russell Hanson, and 
Rom Harré, and to the latter Herbert Dingle, Gerald Whitrow, William 
McCrea, and William Bonnor. We witness in this discussion an instructive 
case of philosophy in science, an unusual dialogue between professional 
philosophers and the spontaneous philosophy of practicing scientists.  
                                                          
15  H. Bondi and T. Gold, The Steady-State Theory of the Expanding Universe, “Monthly 
Notices of the Royal Astronomical Society” 1948, no. 108, pp. 252-270, on p. 269 and 
p. 262.  
16  On the philosophical foundation of steady state cosmology and the discussion of 
its scientific status, see Y. Balashov, Uniformitarianism in Cosmology: Background and 
Philosophical Implications of the Steady-State Theory, “Studies in History and 
Philosophy of Science” 1994, no. 25, pp. 933-958, and H. Kragh, Cosmology and 
Controversy: The Historical Development of Two Theories of the Universe, Princeton 
University Press, Princeton 1996. 
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 Much of the methodological discussion in the 1950s and 1960s 
focused on the criteria on which to judge the scientific nature of the steady 
state theory, or of cosmology in general. To give just a couple of examples, 
Dingle found the cosmological principle – whether in its original CP or the 
“perfect” PCP form – to be plainly unscientific because it was a priori and 
hence in principle inviolable.17 According to Bunge and some other critics, 
the steady state theory was nothing but “science-fiction cosmology” because 
it rested on the ad hoc assumption of continual creation of matter.18 On the 
other hand, and contrary to the later multiverse controversy, testability was 
not at the heart of the discussion. Both parties accepted that a cosmological 
theory must be observationally testable, but they rated this epistemic value 
somewhat differently and did not draw the same conclusions from it.  
 In 1954 Bondi and Whitrow engaged in an interesting public debate 
concerning the scientific status of physical cosmology. Whitrow, stressing the 
unique domain of cosmology, argued that it was not truly scientific and 
probably never would be so. It would remain, he thought, a borderland 
subject between science and philosophy. Bondi, on the other hand, suggested 
that the hallmark of science was falsifiability of theories and that on this 
criterion cosmology was indeed a science. “Every advocate of any 
[cosmological] theory will always be found to stress especially the 
supposedly excellent agreement between the forecasts of his theory and the 
sparse observational results,” he admitted. And yet, 
                                                          
17  H. Dingle, Cosmology and Science, [in:] The Universe, eds. G. Piel et al., Simon and 
Schuster, New York 1956, pp. 131-138. The misguided claim that the cosmological 
principle is a priori has more recently been made by the German philosopher Kurt 
Hübner, according to whom cosmological models rest on a priori constructions that 
are essentially independent of observations. K. Hübner, Critique of Scientific Reason, 
University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1985, pp. 150-152.  
18  M. Bunge, Cosmology and Magic, “The Monist” 1962, no. 47, pp. 116-141.  
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The acceptance of the possibility of experimental and observational disproof 
of any theory is as universal and undisputed in cosmology as in any other 
science, and, though the possibility of logical disproof is not denied in 
cosmology, it is not denied in any other science either. By this test, the cardinal 
test of any science, modern cosmology must be regarded as a science. … I 
consider universal acceptance of the possibility of experimental disproof of 
any claim an absolute test of what constitutes a science.19 
Although not mentioning Karl Popper by name, Bondi was clearly defending 
a main methodological point in Popperian philosophy which he much 
admired. Whitrow, who was also well acquainted with Popper’s views, did 
not disagree, although he warned that falsifiability should not be considered 
a final and absolute criterion: “The important role of disproof in science, 
which has been so cogently argued by K. R. Popper, is intimately related to 
the self-correcting tendency of science and this, in my view, is another aspect 
of the pursuit of unanimity.”20 
 Although Popperian criteria of science played a considerable role 
during the cosmological controversy, and were highlighted by the steady 
state proponents in particular, they were rarely an issue of dispute. By and 
large, criteria of a Popperian kind were accepted also by many cosmologists 
favouring an evolving universe governed by the laws of general relativity. 
One of them was the British astronomer George McVittie, who was strongly 
opposed to the steady state theory and other theories he suspected were 
based on a priori principles. He described the philosophical foundation of 
the Bondi-Gold theory as “Karl Popper’s dictum that a scientific theory can 
never be proved to be true but, instead, that certain theories can be proved to 
                                                          
19  G. J. Whitrow, H. Bondi, Is Physical Cosmology a Science?, “British Journal for the 
Philosophy of Science” 1954, no. 4, pp. 271-283, on p. 279 and p. 282. For the Bondi-
Whitrow discussion, see also H. Kragh, Cosmology and Controversy, op. cit., pp. 233-
237. 
20  Whitrow, Bondi, Is Physical Cosmology a Science?, op. cit., p. 280. 
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be false by an appeal to observation.” While he considered the dictum to be a 
“probably unimpeachable doctrine,” he parodied Bondi’s use of it. If one 
followed Bondi’s vulgar version of Popper’s philosophy, “we should be 
justified in inventing a theory of gravitation which would prove that the 
orbit of every planet was necessarily a circle. The theory would be most 
vulnerable to observation and could, indeed, be immediately shot down.”21 
 
4.  A modern case: The anthropic multiverse 
Like the earlier controversy over the steady state cosmological model, the 
present discussion of the multiverse hypothesis deals to a large extent with 
philosophical issues and the borderline between science and philosophy.22 
Both cases are about foundational issues that cannot be answered simply by 
observation and calculation. Among those issues are: Does the theory belong 
to science proper, or is it rather a philosophical speculation? If it disagrees 
with established standards of science, should these standards perhaps be 
changed? What are the basic criteria for deciding whether a theory is true or 
false? The discussion in 2008 between Bernard Carr and George Ellis 
concerning the multiverse, taking place in the journal Astronomy & 
                                                          
21  G. C. McVittie, Rationalism versus Empiricism in Cosmology, “Science“ 1961, no. 133, 
1231-1236, on p. 1231. McVittie belonged to what he called the “observational 
school” in cosmology. See J.-M. Sánchez-Ron, George McVittie, the Uncompromising 
Empiricist, [in:] The Universe of General Relativity, eds. A. J. Kox, Jean Eisenstaedt, 
Birkhäuser, Boston 2005, pp. 189-222.  
22  The central source in the multiverse debate is Universe or Multiverse, ed. B. Carr, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2007. See also H. Kragh, Higher 
Speculations: Grand Theories and Failed Revolutions in Physics and Cosmology, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford 2011, where further references are given. More popular 
accounts of the multiverse (in one or more of its several versions) include L. 
Susskind, The Cosmic Landscape: String Theory and the Illusion of Intelligent Design, 
Little, Brown and Company, New York 2006, and A. Vilenkin, Many Worlds in One: 
The Search for other Universes, Hill and Wang, New York 2006. 
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Geophysics, can be seen as a modern analogue of the 1954 Bondi-Whitrow 
discussion about the scientific nature of physical cosmology.23 
 However, although the two cosmological controversies have enough 
in common to make a comparison meaningful, there are also some 
dissimilarities. As mentioned, in the case of the steady state theory there was 
a great deal of interest from the side of the philosophers, who were key 
players in the debate. Strangely, a corresponding interest is largely absent in 
the case of the multiverse debate, where the philosophically related questions 
are predominantly discussed by the physicists themselves. Another 
difference is that the overarching question of the multiverse hypothesis is 
whether or not it is testable by ordinary observational means. Does it result 
in predictions of such a kind that, should they turn out to be wrong, the 
hypothesis must be wrong as well? In this respect the cases of the steady 
state and the multiverse are quite different: whereas the first was eminently 
falsifiable – and was in fact falsified – the multiverse fares very badly in 
terms of falsifiability. As has often been pointed out, it explains a lot but 
predicts almost nothing. 
 The current discussion concerning the multiverse involves two major 
questions of obvious relevance to the philosophy of and in science:  
(i) Has cosmology become truly and exclusively scientific, in the sense 
that philosophical considerations no longer play a legitimate role? If so, 
has it achieved this remarkable status by changing the rules of science?  
                                                          
23  B. Carr, G. F. R. Ellis, Universe or Multiverse?, “Astronomy & Geophysics” 2008, 
no. 49, pp. 2.29-2.37.   
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(ii) Which people or groups have the “right” to define these rules of 
science and thus to decide whether or not a particularly theory 
discussed by the scientists is in fact scientific? 
It is far from clear whether some of the recent developments, such as 
multiverse cosmology and aspects of so-called physical eschatology, belong 
primarily to science or philosophy. The idea of many universes, traditionally 
a subject of philosophical speculation, is now claimed to have been 
appropriated by the physical sciences. Is this yet another conquest of the 
ever-victorious physics, at the expense of philosophy? According to Max 
Tegmark, this is indeed the case. “The borderline between physics and 
philosophy has shifted quite dramatically in the last century,” he comments. 
“Parallel universes are now absorbed by that moving boundary. It’s included 
within physics rather than metaphysics.”24 However, sceptics disagree. 
 One problem with the multiverse hypothesis is that the excessive 
amount of universes seems to allow almost any physical state of affairs – if 
not in our universe, then in some other. This, together with the 
unobservability of the other universes, tends to make the multiverse 
unacceptable from Popperian-like points of view. According to Popper’s 
philosophy, a scientific theory must be falsifiable and therefore set 
constraints to the results of possible observations: “Every ‘good’ scientific 
theory is a prohibition: it forbids certain things to happen,” as he said in a 
lecture of 1953.25 At least in some versions, multiverse cosmology suffers 
from an extreme lack of prohibitiveness.  
 Some physicists advocating the multiverse and anthropic reasoning 
have questioned whether there is any need for external norms of science of a 
                                                          
24  Quoted in C. Seife, Physics Enters the Twilight Zone, “Science” 2004, no. 305, p. 465. 
25  K. R. Popper, Conjectures and Refutations, Routledge, New York 1963, p. 48.  
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philosophical nature, these norms being Popperian or something else. “If 
scientists need to change the borders of their own field of research,” says the 
French cosmologist Aurélien Barrau, ”it would be hard to justify a 
philosophical prescription preventing them from doing so.”26 Leonard 
Susskind, the leading advocate of the string-based landscape multiverse 
theory, agrees with Barrau that normative prescriptions are unnecessary and 
may even be harmful. He suggests that only the scientists themselves, or 
perhaps their scientific communities, can decide by means of their practices 
what is and what is not science: “It would be very foolish to throw away the 
right answer on the basis that it doesn’t conform to some criteria for what is 
or isn’t science.”27 Susskind is particularly dissatisfied with the falsification 
criterion and what he calls the “overzealous Popperism” advocated by the 
“Popperazi” following Popper’s philosophy. “Throughout my long 
experience as a scientist,” he says, “I have heard unfalsifiability hurled at so 
many important ideas that I am inclined to think that no idea can have great 
merit unless it has drawn this criticism. … Good scientific methodology is 
not an abstract set of rules dictated by philosophers.”28 
 It needs to be pointed out that the Barrau-Susskind argument is 
deeply problematic and hardly tenable. Not only is it circular reasoning to 
define science as what scientists do, it also presupposes that all scientists 
have roughly the same ideas of what constitutes science, which is definitely 
not the case. Not even within such a relatively small field as theoretical 
cosmology is there any consensus. Subjects that scientists find interesting and 
                                                          
26  A. Barrau, Physics in the Universe, “Cern Courier” 2007 (20 November, online 
edition). 
27  Quoted in G. Brumfiel, Outrageous Fortune, ”Nature” 2006, no. 358, p. 363.  
28  L. Susskind, The Cosmic Landscape, op. cit., pp. 193-195. See also H. Kragh, Higher 
Speculations, op. cit., pp. 280-285. 
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discuss at conferences or write articles about in peer-reviewed journals do 
not automatically belong to the realm of science. Moreover, it makes no sense 
to speak of a “right answer” without appealing, explicitly or implicitly, to 
some criteria of science. To conclude that a theory is either valid or invalid 
necessarily involves certain standards of scientific validity. These standards 
need not be part of a rigid philosophical system (“dictated by philosophers”), 
nor do they have to be explicitly formulated, but it is hard to see how they 
can be avoided. Nature herself does not provide us with the criteria for when 
an answer is right.  
 
5.  Karl Popper and modern cosmology  
As already indicated, Popper’s philosophy of science has played, and 
continues to play, an important role in methodological debates concerning 
cosmology. According to a study by Benjamin Sovacool, astronomers and 
cosmologists often invoke Popper’s ideas as a guide for constructing and 
evaluating theories, although they rarely reveal a deeper familiarity with 
these ideas.29 The first time Popperianism entered the scene of cosmology 
was in the 1950s, in connection with the steady state theory and Bondi’s 
explicit use of standards based on Popper’s philosophy of science. In a 
discussion of modern cosmology from 1960, he summarized Popper’s view 
as follows: “The purpose of a theory is to make forecasts that can be checked 
against observation and experiment. A scientific theory is one that it is in 
principle possible to disprove by empirical means. It is this supremacy of 
                                                          
29  B. Sovacool, Falsification and Demarcation in Astronomy and Cosmology, “Bulletin of 
Science, Technology & Society” 2005, no. 25, pp. 53-62. 
19 
 
empirical disproof that distinguishes science from other human activities. … 
A scientific theory, to be useful, must be testable and vulnerable.”30  
 The leading theoretical physicist and cosmologist Lee Smolin is no 
less a “Popperazo” than Bondi was. As Bondi used Popper’s philosophy to 
criticize the big bang theory, so Smolin uses it to dismiss most versions of 
multiverse cosmology. “According to Popper,” he says, “a theory is 
falsifiable if one can derive from it unambiguous predictions for practical 
experiments, such that – were contrary results seen – at least one premise of 
the theory would have been proven not true. … Confirmation of a prediction 
of a theory does not show that the theory is true, but falsification of a 
prediction can show it is false.”31  
 In regard of the considerable impact of Popper’s thoughts, it is 
remarkable that physical cosmology is hardly mentioned at all in his main 
works. Yet a closer look reveals that cosmology does turn up in his books 
and papers, most explicitly in a lecture given in 1982 in Alpbach, Austria. 
Calling cosmology “the most philosophically important of all the sciences,” 
at this occasion he praised the by then defunct Bondi-Gold-Hoyle theory as 
“a very fine and promising theory,” not because it was true but because it 
was testable and had in fact been falsified. As a result of measurements 
based on methods of radio astronomy, “it seems to have been refuted in 
favour of the (older) big bang theory of expansion.”32 Popper did not 
                                                          
30  H. Bondi, The Steady-State Theory of the Universe, [in:] Rival Theories of Cosmology, 
eds. H. Bondi et al., Oxford University Press, London 1960, pp. 12-21, on p. 12.  
31  L. Smolin, Scientific Alternatives to the Anthropic Principle, [in:] Universe or 
Multiverse?, ed. B. Carr, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2007, pp. 323-366, 
on pp. 323-324. Emphasis added. For Smolin as a self-declared “Popperazo,” see L. 
Smolin, The Trouble with Physics, Penguin Books, London 2008, p. 369. 
32  K. R. Popper, In Search of a Better World: Lectures and Essays from Thirty Years 1994, 
Routledge, London, pp. 58-60. For a full account of Popper’s view of cosmology and 
the impact of his philosophy on cosmologists, see H. Kragh, “The Most 
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mention the cosmic microwave background radiation or other evidence 
(such as the measured amount of helium in the universe) that had laid the 
steady state theory in the grave. 
 Although references to Popper’s philosophy of science often appear 
in modern cosmology, it is probably fair to say that few of the physicists and 
astronomers have actually read him. Most seem to rely on what they have 
been told or happen to know from the secondary literature. This results in 
discussions that are sometimes simplistic and based on misunderstandings. 
What cosmologists (and other scientists) discuss is most often naïve 
falsificationism rather than the sophisticated versions of authentic 
Popperianism.33 Popper’s views, including his awareness that falsifiability 
cannot stand alone as a demarcation criterion, were far from the caricatures 
one can sometimes meet in the science literature. It should be recalled that 
his philosophy was normative and that he did not claim that the associated 
standards reflected the actual practice of scientists. Moreover, he never held 
that falsifiability is a sufficient condition for a theory being scientific, but 
only that it is a necessary condition. Although somewhat ambiguous with 
regard to the relationship between his methodological rules and scientific 
practice, he admitted that strict falsifiability does not belong to the real world 
of science: 
In point of fact, no conclusive disproof of a theory can ever be produced; 
for it is always possible to say that the experimental results are not reliable, 
or that the discrepancies which are asserted to exist between the 
experimental results and the theory are only apparent and that they will 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Philosophically Important of All the Sciences”: Karl Popper and Physical Cosmology, 
http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/9062, a version of which will appear in a 
forthcoming issue of Perspectives on Science.  
33  As pointed out in M. Heller, Ultimate Explanations of the Universe, Springer-Verlag, 
Berlin 2009, pp. 88-89.  
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disappear with the advance of our understanding. … If you insist on strict 
proof (or strict disproof) in the empirical sciences, you will never benefit 
from experience, and never learn from it how wrong you are.34 
Contrary to what many scientists believe, Popper did not assign any absolute 
value to the criterion of falsifiability and did not consider it a definition of 
science. He recognized that the distinction between metaphysics and science 
is often blurred. “What was a metaphysical idea yesterday can become a 
testable theory tomorrow,” he wrote.35 Far from elevating falsificationism to 
an inviolable principle, he suggested that it is itself fallible and that it may be 
rational to keep even an admittedly wrong theory alive for some time. 
Popper wrote as follows: 
There is a legitimate place for dogmatism, though a very limited place. He 
who gives up his theory too easily in the face of apparent refutations will 
never discover the possibilities inherent in his theory. There is room in 
science for debate: for attack and therefore also for defence. Only if we try to 
defend them can we learn all the different possibilities inherent in our 
theories. As always, science is conjecture. You have to conjecture when to 
stop defending a favourite theory, and when to try a new one.36 
This is indeed a view far from the strict or naïve falsificationism often 
discussed by scientists either for or against Popper. It is a view closer to the 
one associated with philosophers of science such as Imre Lakatos and 
Thomas Kuhn. 
  
                                                          
34  K. R. Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, Basic Books, New York 1959, p. 50. 
In a note appended to the English edition, Popper remarked that “I have been 
constantly misinterpreted as upholding a criterion (and moreover one of meaning 
rather than of demarcation) based upon a doctrine of ‘complete’ or ‘conclusive’ 
falsifiability.”  
35  K. R. Popper, Replies to my Critics, [in:] The Philosophy of Karl Popper, ed. P. A. 
Schilpp, Open Court Publishing House, La Salle, IL 1974, pp. 961-1200, on p. 981.  
36  K. R. Popper, Replies to my Critics, op.cit., p. 984. Popper’s emphasis. 
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6.  The role of historical analogies 
Just like scientists use methodological and other philosophical arguments in 
evaluating the value of a fundamental scientific theory, sometimes they use 
(or misuse) arguments relating to the history of science. The typical way of 
doing this is by supporting an argument of a philosophical kind by means of 
concrete historical cases in the form of exemplars. That is, history is used 
analogically. The standard formula is this: Since, in a certain historical case, 
the epistemic value x proved successful, a modern theory should preferably 
incorporate x; or, conversely, if values of the kind y have proved a blind alley 
in the past, they should be avoided in a modern theory. The values or 
prescriptions x and y will usually be those associated with either well known 
successes or failures in the history of science. Often it is enough to associate 
them with the great authorities of the past.  
 Historical analogy arguments of this kind are quite common in 
controversies and in discussions of theories of a foundational nature. Einstein 
often relied on historical exemplars when he wanted to illustrate and give 
support to his favourite deductivist methodology of science, such as he did 
in the semi-popular book The Evolution of Physics.37 During the cosmological 
controversy in the 1950s, some physicists and astronomers used Galileo’s 
supposed empiricism as a weapon against what they considered rationalistic 
and a priori tendencies in the steady state theory. McVittie associated this 
theory with Aristotle’s dogmatic world system (!) and the empirical 
cosmology based on general relativity with Galileo’s physics. Dingle 
similarly claimed that the perfect cosmological principle has “precisely the 
                                                          
37  For an analysis of Einstein’s attitude to and use of the history of science, see H. 
Kragh, Einstein on the History and Nature of Science, [in:] The Way through Science and 
Philosophy, eds. H. B. Andersen et al., College Publications, London 2006, pp. 99-118.  
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same nature as perfectly circular orbits and immutable heavens” and that “it 
is largely identical with the Aristotelian principle of celestial regions.”38 It 
was and still is common to refer to the epicycles of ancient astronomy when 
scientists want to criticize a theory for being complicated and ad hoc. 
 In other cases the references to history are not to concrete events or 
persons, but of the “history suggests” type where the record of some general 
idea in past science is used to evaluate the methodological basis of a modern 
theory. For example, string theory notoriously lacks connection to 
experiment and is, according to some critics, largely justified by the dubious 
idea that fundamental physics must be mathematically beautiful. One of the 
critics, Daniel Friedan, says: “History suggests that it is unwise to extrapolate 
to fundamental principles of nature from the mathematical forms used by 
theoretical physics in any particular epoch of its history, no matter how 
impressive their success. … Mathematical beauty in physics cannot be 
appreciated until after it has proved useful.”39  
 Again, although the anthropic principle does not lead to precise 
predictions, it may be justified by referring to historical cases in which a 
theory has been highly successful in spite of its limited predictivity. The 
prime example of such a theory is Darwinian evolution, which is sometimes 
referred to in the debate over the standards to be used in fundamental 
physics and cosmology. “One is reminded of Darwin’s theory, which is a 
powerful explanatory tool even though some question its predictive power,” 
says Craig Hogan. “Anthropic arguments are vulnerable in the same way to 
                                                          
38  H. Dingle, Cosmology and Science, op. cit., p. 137. 
39  D. Friedan, A Tentative Theory of Large Distance Physics, “Journal of High Energy 
Physics” 2003, no. 10, 063. 
24 
 
‘Just So’ storytelling but may nevertheless form an important part of 
cosmological theory.”40  
 One historical case that occurs surprisingly often in the universe-or-
multiverse discussion is Kepler’s geometrical model of the heliocentric 
universe as expounded in his Mysterium Cosmographicum from 1596. When 
multiverse proponents refer to Kepler’s model, it is invariably as a negative 
exemplar, to illustrate that the universe is probably not uniquely described 
by the mathematical solutions to the equations of physics. According to 
Steven Weinberg, “We may just have to resign ourselves to a retreat, just as 
Newton had to give up Kepler’s hope of a calculation of the relative sizes of 
planetary orbits from first principles.”41 Frank Wilczek uses the same case to 
argue for the same conclusion: “In the development of Copernican-
Newtonian celestial mechanics, attractive a priori ideas about the perfect 
shape of planetary orbits (Ptolemy) and their origin in pure geometry 
(Kepler) had to be sacrificed.”42 On the other hand, Kepler may also be used 
as a positive exemplar (and Galileo as a negative exemplar), as Martin Rees 
does in his argument for the multiverse: “Kepler discovered that planets 
moved in ellipses, not circles. Galileo was upset by this. … The parallel is 
obvious. … A bias in favour of ‘simple’ cosmologies may be as short-sighted 
as was Galileo’s infatuation with circles.”43 
                                                          
40  C. J. Hogan, Why the Universe Is Just So, “Reviews of Modern Physics” 2000, no. 
72, pp. 1149-1161, on p. 1160. 
41  S. Weinberg, Living in the Multiverse, [in:] B. Carr, Universe or Multiverse, op. cit., 
pp. 29-42, on p. 39. 
42  F. Wilczek, Enlightenment, Knowledge, Ignorance, Temptation, [in:] B. Carr, Universe 
or Multiverse, op. cit., pp. 43-53, on p. 50. 
43  M. Rees, Explaining the Universe, [in:] J. Cornwell, Explanation, op. cit., pp. 39-66, on 
p. 63. 
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 My last example of the questionable use of history of science comes 
from Carr, who suggests that critics of the multiverse are on the wrong side 
of history. Throughout the history of cosmology, the universe has always 
been conceived as bigger and bigger, he claims, so why be satisfied with a 
single universe instead of a whole lot of them? Carr’s argument may have 
some rhetorical force, but it is poor from both the perspective of history and 
from a logical point of view. At any rate, here it is:  
Throughout the history of science, the universe has always gotten bigger. 
We’ve gone from geocentric to galactocentric. Then in the 1920s there was 
this huge shift when we realized that our galaxy wasn’t the universe. I just 
see this as one more step in the progression. Every time this expansion has 
occurred, the more conservative scientists have said, ‘This isn’t science.’ 
This is the same process repeating itself.44 
This is not the place for discussing the role of history of science in scientific 
or philosophical arguments, but it needs to be pointed out that in general one 
should be very cautious with reasoning based on historical analogies and 
extrapolations from historical trends. Historical arguments and analogies 
have a legitimate function in the evaluation of current science.45 We cannot 
avoid being guided by the past, and it would be silly to disregard the 
historical record when thinking about the present and the future. On the 
other hand, such guidance should be based on historical insight and not, as is 
often the case, on arbitrary selections from a folk version of history. 
                                                          
44  Quoted in T. Folger, Science’s Alternative to an Intelligent Creator: The Multiverse 
Theory, “Discover Magazine” (online version) 2008. In fact, the universe has not 
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Generally speaking, the history of science is so diverse and complex that it is 
very difficult to draw from it lessons of operational value for modern science. 
In 1956, in connection with the controversy over the steady state theory, Gold 
reflected on the lessons of history of science with regard to the methodology 
of cosmology and other sciences. He considered history to be an unreliable 
guide: 
Analogies drawn from the history of science are frequently claimed to be a 
guide [to progress] in science; but, as with forecasting the next game of 
roulette, the existence of the best analogy to the present is no guide 
whatever to the future. The most valuable lesson to be learned from the 
history of scientific progress is how misleading and strangling such 
analogies have been, and how success has come to those who ignored 
them.46 
Of course, scientists should not ignore history. They can and should use the 
rich treasure of resources hidden in the history of science, but they must do it 
with proper caution and professional insight. 
                                                          
46  T. Gold, Cosmology, “Vistas in Astronomy” 1956, no. 2, pp. 1721-1726, on p. 1722. 
